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Showing posts from 2007

NJ Foreclosure Ruling - Final Judgment Merges Mortgage

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In a case that merits attention by banks and lawyers practicing debtor and creditors' rights, the Chancery Division in Middlesex County held that upon satisfaction of a final judgment of foreclosure a mortgagor is entitled to receive only a warrant of satisfaction of judgment, not a discharge of the mortgage in the County recording office. Washington Mutual, FA v. Wroblewski , F-1865-05. In this case, the bank sought reconsideration of an order issued by the Chancery Court requiring that it provide a discharge of mortgage to the defendant mortgagor based on the mortgagor's satisfaction/payment of the final judgment of foreclosure. The applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-32 provides that when a judgment of foreclosure is satisfied, a warrant of satisfaction shall be entered. The defendants argued that upon satisfaction of a final judgment of foreclosure the lender should no longer have a claim for monies due and the mortgage should therefore be discharged. The bank's counter

NJ Supreme Court Issues Significant Ruling in Medical Malpractice Case Involving Termination of Pregnancy

September 12, 2007 In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the difficult question of determining whether a physician is required to inform a patient, who was in the 6th to 8th week of her pregnancy, that an abortion procedure will kill not just potential life, but an actual existing human being. In this case, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action claiming that her physician, an obstetrician-gynecologist, performed an abortion without her informed consent. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that the doctor breached his duty to her by failing to inform her of "the scientific and medical fact [that her six-to-eight-week-old embryo] was a complete, separate, unique, and irreplaceable human being" and that an abortion would result in "killing an existing human being." In finding in favor of the doctor, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there is no common law duty requiring a physician to inform a pregnant patient t

NJ Supreme Court Justice Now Admits Ethics Violation

June 1, 2007. New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto conceded that he violated judicial ethics rules by creating an appearance of impropriety in contacting school, police and court authorities in a dispute involving his son, but denied any deliberate misconduct. In a letter to the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, he stated that in order to "prevent any further harm to the Court's reputation" he would waive a formal hearing and stipulate that the charges against him be decided on the basis of the investigatory record and his statement in lieu of formal testimony. "I deeply regret that my actions in defense of my son have raised questions about my integrity, and have created the potential to undermine the public's trust and confidence in the Court," Rivera-Soto remarked, adding he was "profoundly sorry" for his actions and their effect. But Rivera-Soto did not recede his position asserted in his May 18 answer that he sought

New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Faces The Heat in Judicial Ethics Charges

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A New Jersey judicial ethics committee filed a Complaint against New Jersey associate Supreme Court Justice Roberto River-Soto on May 11, 2007 accusing him of violating certain Judicial Canons, and R. 4:15-8(a)(6) which bars conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute. The Complaint stems from Justice Rivero-Soto's involvement with his son's juvenile delinquency complaint filed in municipal court against another high school football player accused of harassment. Rivera-Soto's son accused the captain of the Haddonfield Memorial High School football team of assaulting him during practice. According to the ethics committee complaint — just the second ethics complaint filed against a state Supreme Court justice in more than three decades — Rivera-Soto made phone calls or wrote letters to team and school officials, the local police chief, two judges and the Camden County prosecutor on behalf of his son. At times, the ethics complaint charged, Rivera-Soto alluded to hi

NJ Internet Users' Aliases Are Private, Appellate Court Rules

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Computer users in New Jersey can expect that personal information they give their Internet service providers will be treated as private, a state appellate court decided yesterday in the first such case considered in the state. The court ruled that a computer user whose screen name hid her identity had a "legitimate and substantial" interest in anonymity . As a result, New Jersey and several other states will give greater privacy rights to computer users than do most federal courts, and law-enforcement officers in New Jersey will need to obtain valid subpoenas or search warrants to obtain the information. The appellate panel's unanimous ruling stemmed from the indictment of Shirley Reid, who was suspected of breaking into the computer system of her employer in Cape May County in 2004 and changing its shipping address and password for suppliers. The decision upholds a lower court ruling suppressing information from Reid's Internet service provider that linked her with a

"Judge, Don't Interrupt My Client's Testimony To Warn About Criminal Implications"

A trial court judge's actions in interrupting a litigant's testimony during cross-examination to warn him about possible criminal implications if his testimony revealed tax fraud was improper, the Appellate Division held in All Modes Transport Inc. v. Hecksteden, A-0361-05T5, December 27, 2006 . Combined with this warning, the trial court suggested the parties settle the case. After this exchange by the trial judge, the defendants agreed to settle the case for a substantial sum of money. Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a motion requesting the trial court to vacate the settlement arguing that they were coerced into the settlement by the trial judge's threat of criminal prosecution. The trial court denied defendants' motion, concluding that the settlement agreement was not procured by coercion. The trial court was of the opinion that it had a duty to warn to warn the defendant that continuation of his testimony on cross-examination could result in self-inc